NOTES
THE VERY SPECIALIZED UNITED STATES
GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: AN
EXAMINATION OF RENEWAL CHANGES AND
ANALYSIS OF THEIR LEGAL EFFECT
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of utilizing preferential tariff treatment to promote
development in lesser developed countries (LDCs) originated' over
twenty years ago at the first session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) in 1964.2 In his keynote report to UNCTAD I, Argentine economist Raul Prebisch
suggested, as a logical extension of the infant-industry argument,3
that temporary preferential tariff treatment would help developing
countries avoid the high initial costs of market penetration that
make entry into foreign developed economies difficult.4 This
Isolated cases of special tariff preferences have existed for many years. Britain and
France had special trading relationships with their former colonies. This concept was continued by the Yaounde Convention signed in 1963 by a group of 18 former African colonies

and the European Economic Community.
DEVELOPMENT,

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND

THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES: REVIEW OF THE FIRST DECADE 9

(1983) [hereinafter cited as OECD]. The United States gave Cuban products preferred duty
rates until 1961 and gave Phillippine products duty-rate cuts until 1975. Graham, The U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences for Developing Countries: International Innovation
and the Art of the Possible, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 513, 514 n.4 (1978). Alexander Hamilton,
more than a century ago recognized in his "Report on Manufacturers" that developing countries should be granted preferential treatment to promote growth against firmly established
foreign competition. He argued for protection of the developing country's infant industries
until such growth occurred. Behnam, Development and Structure of the Generalized System of Preferences, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 442, 442 (1975).
2 Proceedings of The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1st Sess.),
U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 46/141 (1964).
3 The central argument in favor of the General System of Preferences (GSP) was for a
pattern of temporary preferences which could enable infant-industries in developing countries to become competitive in the world market. See H. JOHNSON, ECONOMIC POLICIES ToWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 181 (1967).
4 Prebisch, "Toward a New Trade Policy for Development," 2 Proceedings of The United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (1st Sess.) at 35, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 46/141
(1964). Not only were start-up costs high, but developing countries were also discouraged
from industrializing since tariff rates increased with the degree of product processing. As a
result, it was much easier to continue to export raw materials and less sophisticated manu-
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UNCTAD I initiative sparked passage of Resolution 21 (II),' which
recognized "the unanimous agreement in favour of the early establishment of a mutually acceptable system of generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences." 6 Following the lead
of several other developed countries,7 the United States under the
authority of Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 s extended duty free
treatment 9 to imports from LDCs. The United States Generalized
System of Preferences (US-GSP), similar to other countries' programs1 ° and in line with the infant-industry rationale," was scheduled to terminate after a designated number of years. 2

factured goods. The preferences being proposed would solve this cycle by targeting manufactured and semi-manufactured products for preferential treatment. Behnam, supra note 1,
at 443.
1 Resolution 21 (11) was adopted at the second conference of UNCTAD in 1968. United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Review and Evaluation of the Generalized
System of Preferences, Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, para. 5, U.N. DOC. TD/232
(1979), reprinted in 3 Proceedings of The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (5th Sess.) U.N. DOC. TD/269 (1981). The three specific aims outlined by
UNCTAD concerning the GSP were: (1) to increase export earnings; (2) to promote industrialization; and (3) to accelerate economic growth rates. Id.
6 See id. at para. 10.
Countries which implemented GSP programs before the United States were Australia,
Austria, Canada, the original six member states of the European Economic Community
(EEC) (the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland later incorporated into the EEC scheme
their separate GSP programs), Finland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland,
Bulgaria, Czechoslavakia, Hungary, and the USSR. Poland implemented its plan on the
same day as the United States. Graham, supra note 1, at 513 n.1.
" Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1982).
' Duty-free treatment is preferential since generally all goods imported into the United
States are subject to a duty unless specifically exempted. Note, The Renewal of the United
States Generalized System of Preferences: A Legal and Economic Evaluation of the System and Proposals for Change, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 365, n.6 (1983).
" For a general description of the GSP programs of other countries see OECD, supra
note 1. The European Economic Community (EEC) recently renewed and revised a program
similar to the US-GSP by completing the "Third ACP-EEC Convention Signed at Lome on
8 December 1984." For a complete text of the Lome III Convention see 89 THE COURIER,
Jan.-Feb. 1985. The EEC's preferential trade arrangements are extended to 65 developing
countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP). Duty-free treatment to ACP exports by the EEC is just a part of the total economic and technical assistance coordinated
through the Lome Conventions. Id. at 22-32. The United States should adopt its own comprehensive package by combining the GSP program with other aid and trade arrangements
benefiting the developing countries. Such a coordinated effort is the best way of providing a
structured foundation of development to the LDCs.
" Preferences were intended only to aid temporarily the infant industries of developing
countries until such industries became competitive in the foreign markets of developed
countries. See Prebisch, supra note 4, at 37-38.
12 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2465(a) (1982). The program of preferences was scheduled to expire in 10 years. Id.
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In response to the planned expiration date of January 3, 1985,13
President Reagan signed into law on October 30, 1984, a proposal
which renewed and revised the US-GSP. 14 This legislation, attached to an omnibus trade bill to expedite passage, is the culmination of congressional effort and special interest group lobbying.
The final plan for renewal reflects a labored compromise of the
Senate and House bills carefully integrated by a joint-conference
committee.1 5
This Note examines the changes embodied in the legislation renewing and revising the US-GSP. Emphasis is placed on assessing
the impact of these changes on both the case law that has evolved
under the earlier system and the legal infrastructure of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 6 Part II presents a brief
background on how the US-GSP evolved, how the earlier system
operated, and how the new legislation changes the existing scheme.
Part III surveys the case law that has arisen due to the operation
of the US-GSP and attempts to give the practitioner guidelines for
avoiding or utilizing the legal system under the renewal plan. To
supplement this practical approach, Part IV discusses the theoretical legal implications of these changes upon the most-favored-nation (MFN) provisions of the GATT.
This Note concludes with the suggestion that traders turn to the
judicial system more to challenge unfavorable actions by the President or Customs regarding operation of the US-GSP. Congress
should make additional modifications in the program to enable
more efficient use of the judicial option. The Executive should
strive to deemphasize the reciprocal nature of the US-GSP as revised. If the President insists on stressing reciprocity, developing
countries should refuse to participate in the program. Nonparticipation might not be too disadvantageous if accompanied by further
reduction in the overall tariff structure and relaxation of non-tariff
trade barriers to LDC's exports.

13 Id. The US-GSP was signed into law on January 3, 1975 (see infra notes 32-33 and
accompanying text) making the 10 year deadline for expiration January 3, 1985.

" Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 501-508, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018-24 (to
be codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465). See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
"
16

See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, done Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No.

1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
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EVOLUTION, OPERATION, AND CHANGES

Brief Evolution of US-GSP

17

In the wake of the UNCTAD I discussions, the United States
emerged as the leader of a group of countries opposed to the concept of preferential treatment.1 8 Opposition by the United States
stemmed from skepticism that a preference scheme for developing
countries would provide worthwhile benefit in light of the Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations for overall tariff reductions.1 " The
United States also feared that LDCs would hamper future MFN
tariff reductions in efforts to preserve their margins of
preference.2 0
Eventually, however, the United States altered its isolated position due to increased pressure from Latin American countries that
were not benefiting from European preference systems.21 Similarly,
the United States changed its position after realizing that a Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program could thwart the
trend toward world trade cartels through preference arrangements
to which it was not privy.22 President Johnson clearly marked the
reversal of the opposing position by the United States in his statement on April 14, 1967, that "[wie (the United States) are ready to
explore with other industrialized countries - and with our own
people - the possibility of temporary preferential tariff advantages for all developing countries in the markets of all the industri17 For a detailed discussion of how the US-GSP originally evolved, see generally Graham,
supra note 1.
" Id. at 516.

19Id. The economic benefit from GSP schemes has been reduced due to overall cuts in
tariff rates. See infra notes 289-91 and accompanying text. The contracting parties to the
GATT have held periodic rounds of negotiations designed to decrease the various restrictions on the flow of international goods. The "Kennedy Round" of multilateral trade negotiations marked the last such multination negotiation round directed primarily at the reciprocal reduction of tariffs. Later rounds, like the Tokyo Round, began to shift focus to
eliminating non-tariff trade barriers "such as the exclusion of (or other discrimination
against) foreign suppliers in bidding for government contracts; failure to certify foreign
products as meeting domestic product standards; or the appraising of imports in a way that
artificially inflates their value and thus increases the duties payable on them." See Graham,
Results of the Tokyo Round, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 153, 156-57.
"0 Graham, supra note 1, at 516.
" Id. at 516-17. This motive was especially evident in President Johnson's statement of
April 14, 1967, which emphasized that the United States would pursue a preferential scheme
"with a view to improving the condition of the Latin American export trade." American
Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este, 56 DEP'T ST. BULL. 706, 717 (1967).
" Graham, supra note 1, at 516-17.
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23

alized countries.
Despite its reversal in position, the United States was not among
the original countries to adopt a GSP scheme. 24 Most countries implemented their GSP programs very quickly through administrative regulations. 25 The US-GSP was slower in developing because it
required legislative action due to the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution. 2 Political complications 27 and protracted congressional negotiation 2s also hampered the development
of the US-GSP. The trade bill implementing the US-GSP 29 was
not officially signed into law by President Ford until January 3,
1975.30
B.

Operation of the US-GSP

A basic explanation" of the existing program's design is a prerequisite to detailing fully the changes brought about by the legislation renewing and revising the US-GSP. The initial section of
Title V of the Trade Act grants to the President the authority to
extend any preferences allowed under this title of the Trade Act of
1974.32 In making his decision, the President is limited to assessing

American Chiefs of State Meet at Punta del Este, supra note 21, at 709.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
22 Graham, supra note 1, at 520.
2" Legislation was necessary because only Congress has the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27 Congress was distracted from debating the GSP program due to strained United
States-Soviet Union relations over the Jewish immigration problem and a new energy crisis
due to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Intense congressional
concern over the usurpation of its power by the President also made Congress, due to the
Watergate Crisis, hesitant to accept the GSP proposal designed to give the Executive broad
discretionary powers over its operation. T. MURRAY, TRADE PREFERENCES FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 78-79 (1977).
28 The President submitted his GSP proposal as Title VI of H.R. 6767, the widely supported Trade Reform Act of 1973, on April 10, 1973. The House passed GSP provisions in
December 1973 as Title V of the Trade Reform Act of 1973. These GSP provisions were
almost identical to the Administration's proposal. The Senate changed the bill's name to the
Trade Act of 1974 and passed it on December 13, 1974. The Congressional Conference Report was accepted on December 20, 1974. Graham, supra note 1, at 523 n. 37, 524.
29 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1982).
30 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. (Jan. 10, 1975).
"' For a detailed examination of the intricate and complex operation of the US-GSP see
Nemmers & Rowland, The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences: Too Much System,
Too Little Preference, 9 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 855 (1977).
2 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1982). The statute provides that "[tihe President
may provide duty-free treatment for any eligible article from any beneficiary developing
country in accordance with the provisions of this subchapter." Id.
22
2
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the impact on the beneficiary developing country's (BDC's) development, the extent to which other developed countries are making
a comparable effort to assist the BDC by preferential tariff treatment, and the expected effect preference designation might have
on domestic United States producers of like or directly competitive
products. 3
1.

Designation of BDCs

The President has discretion to designate BDCs primarily because of the difficulty Congress had in finding a workable definition of a developing country.34 The statutory criteria governing the
President's discretionary designation of BDCs are: an expression
by the applying country of some interest to be designated as a
BDC, the degree of economic development present in the country,
whether the proposed BDC is preference-eligible in other developed countries, and some assurance to the United States of equitable and reasonable access to the applying country's markets and
commodity resources. 5 Congress, however, has specifically denied
BDC eligibility to the member states of the European Economic
Community and seventeen other countries.3
Congress also detailed seven restrictive prohibitions governing
the President's discretion in designating a country as eligible for
GSP treatment.3 7 Included in the Trade Act of 1974 is a general
prohibition against GSP treatment for communist countries3 8 with
only a few exceptions. 39 Developing countries that grant reverse
preferences to developed countries other than the United States
are also prohibited from the President's consideration. 0 Congress

Id.
Congress realized that a list would quickly become outdated due to changes in circumstances and that statistical criteria such as per capita income only crudely distinguishes
between income levels. Consequently, Congress intentionally granted the President discretionary power in designating BDCs. See S. REP. No. 1298, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 219, reprinted
in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7186, 7349 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report].
3' Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c) (1982).
§ 2462(b). The seventeen countries originally excluded were: Australia, Austria, Ca36 Id.
nada, Czechoslovakia, Finland, East Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics. Id.
11 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1982); see also infra note 45.
38 Id. § 2462(b)(1).
39 A communist country may be designated a BDC if its products receive nondiscriminatory treatment, it is a contracting party to GATT and a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and it is not dominated or controlled by international communism. Id.
§ 2462(b)(3). One goal of the US-GSP was to avoid or discourage limited preferen40 Id.
"3

31
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excluded members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) and any other parties to foreign cartels from
preferential treatment.4 As amended in 1979, the OPEC provisions allow the President to designate as beneficiaries OPEC members which entered a bilateral trade agreement with the United
States before January 3, 1980. "2 Unless the President determines
that designation as a BDC is in the national economic interest of
the United States,4 3 countries which have expropriated United
States property without quick and sufficient compensation or an
agreement to submit to binding arbitration on the matter of compensation are excluded from consideration."' Countries which fail
to honor arbitral awards in favor of the United States, refuse to
cooperate with the United States on the prevention of illegal drug
smuggling, or intentionally aid or harbor persons who have committed an international act of terrorism are also excluded unless
the President decides exclusion is not economically sound. 5

tial trade agreements such as those between the EEC and Mediterranean developing countries. Senate Report, supra note 34, at 221; see also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying
text. This provision does not apply if such reverse preferences do not have a significant
adverse impact on United States commerce. Cyprus, Israel, and Turkey, therefore, were
found to be eligible for GSP designation despite the granting of some reverse preferential
treatment. Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 858-59.
"' Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(2) (1982). President Ford specifically singled
out this OPEC exclusion for criticism when signing the Trade Act of 1974 into law. Gerald
R. Ford, Remarks Upon Signing the Trade Act of 1974, 1975 PUB. PAPERS 3. There were
subsequently several unsuccessful congressional attempts to provide BDC status to such
countries as Venezuela and Ecuador which, though members of OPEC, did not participate
in the 1973 oil boycott against the United States. See Graham, supra note 1, at 529; Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 858.
42 Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 1111(a)(2), 93 Stat. 144, 315-16
(amending 19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-2465 (1976)). Following this amendment, the President designated Ecuador, Indonesia, and Venezuela as BDCs effective 30 March 1980. COMM. ON WAYS
& MEANS, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST FIVE YEARS' OPERATION OF THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) 25 (Comm. Print 1980)

(transmitted by the President) [hereinafter cited as President'sReport].
" The statute provides that paragraphs (4), (5), (6) and (7) shall not prohibit a country's
designation as a BDC if the President determines such designation is in the economic interest of the United States. The President must also report his findings and reasons supporting
such a determination to Congress. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b) (1982).
" Id. § 2462(b)(4). The statute provides an exception from this provision if the President
determines that the expropriated property is being restored or good faith steps toward restoration or arbitration of the dispute are underway. Id.
.5
Id. § 2462(b)(5)-(b)(7). Paragraph (7) was not in the original statute. It was implemented by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1802, 90 Stat. 1520, 1763-64
(codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2462(b)(7) (1976)). Following the Israeli commando raid on Entebbe
Airport, Uganda was struck from the list of BDCs for harboring the terrorists involved in
this raid. Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 859.
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In an effort to encourage regionally integrated economies among
developing country groups, Congress amended the Title V provisions regarding the GSP eligibility of customs unions.46 The original provisions restricted regional groupings by requiring a higher
value-added percentage' 7 than that for products shipped from a
single BDC. Under the broader definition provided in 1979, associated countries contributing to comprehensive regional economic integration are treated as a single country. 8 Now such regional economic groups as ASEAN, 9 the Andean Pact, 50 CACM,5 l and
Caricom5 2 may be treated as individual BDCs.
2.

Designation of Eligible Articles

Before designating a particular article as eligible for GSP treatment, the President is required to receive advice from the International Trade Commission (ITC).5 3 The Office of the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) coordinates the President's determination of eligible articles."' In composing the list to be submitted for review by the ITC, the President may receive petitions
from any interested party. 55 Those articles finally designated ap48

Trade Agreements Act of 1979, § 1111(a) (1979).

President's Report, supra note 42, at 24. Under the original statute, 50 percent of the
value of the product had to be added from within a region before such product could be
eligible for GSP from this regional grouping. The 1979 amendment reduced such cumulative
value-added requirements for regional groupings to 35 percent (the same as the value-added
requirements of individual countries). For a more detailed discussion of value-added requirements, see infra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
48 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a)(3) (1982). To further promote such associations,
the competitive-need limits are applied to the individual BDC of a qualifying association
rather than to the entire association. President'sReport, supra note 42, at 24. For an explanation of competitive-need limits, see infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
" (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). President's Report,
supra note 42, at 24 n.1.
50 (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela). Id.
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua). Id.
82 (Antigua, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Tobago). Id.
5 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a) (1982). In seeking the advice of the ITC, the
President submits a list of potential articles from designated BDCs. Id.
84 Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 860-62.
5 Id. at 861. Potential interested parties range from domestic or foreign manufacturers,
importers, consumer groups, labor unions, and domestic trade associations, to foreign governments, shippers and trade associations. Even state or local government agencies of the
United States may act as interested parties. Id. at n.39. The petition and review process for
eligible articles under 15 C.F.R. § 2007.0 (1976) is not applicable to decisions concerning
BDC designations since these delegations are "normally made by the Federal government on
its own motion and frequently on the basis of information not available to the general public." Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 860 n.32.
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propriate for GSP eligibility must be indicated by Executive
Order. 6
Only articles imported into the customs territory of the United
States directly from a BDC are potential candidates for GSP eligibility.5 7 Indeed, all countries specifically limit GSP treatment to
products of designated BDCs according to stated rules of origin.
For products not wholly of BDC origin, most countries require that
at least a single substantial transformation of the imported goods
used in the product occur within the BDC.5 5 The United States, on
the other hand, requires a substantial transformation of both the
imported material used in making the product in the BDC and the
final product itself."' The Trade Act of 1974 requires that the sum
of (i) the cost or value of the materials produced in the BDC and
(ii) the direct cost of processing operations performed in substantially transforming imported goods or the final product exceed or
equal thirty-five percent of the value of the product as appraised
by United States Customs.6 0
Congress specifically elected to exclude the following articles
from GSP-treatment: (1) textiles subject to textile agreements; (2)
watches; (3) import-sensitive electronics, steel articles and glass
products; (4) certain footwear; and (5) other import-sensitive articles as determined by the President in the context of GSP.6 Further, duty-free treatment cannot be extended to any article subject
to import relief or national security import measures.6 2 The focus
of most of these per se exclusions is the test of import-sensitivity, 3
even though such a criterion has not been clearly defined." The
USTR, therefore, generally applies the import-sensitivity test on a

" Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463(a) (1982).

51 Id. § 2463(b)(1). The only exception to this direct shipment requirement is if some
labeling, marking, testing, packing or repacking, or purchase and resale for export other
than at retail occurs within the free trade zone of another BDC. The most significant of
such free trade zones is Singapore. Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 881.
" United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Compedium of rules of origin
applied under the generalized system of preferences by OECD preference-giving countries at
9-12, U.N. Doc. TD/B/626 (1976). Rules of origin provide criteria to determine if a particular eligible article originated in a BDC so as to be capable of receiving GSP treatment. The
purpose of the rules of origin is to prevent non-BDCs from merely routing their goods
through BDCs, and thereby receiving duty-free treatment. Id.
" Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 870.
" Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463(b)(2) (1982).
"' Id. § 2463(c)(1).
" Id. § 2463(c)(2).
" Note, supra note 9, at 372-73.
" Id. at 372 n.60.
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case-by-case basis.6 5 Finally, if the President invokes quotas or increased tariffs as a remedy through an escape clause, 66 imported
articles implicated may not be designated for GSP treatment during the time such remedies are in force. 7
3.

Withdrawal from GSP Designation

Preferential treatment is not permanently guaranteed since a
country or eligible article may be removed from the US-GSP 6
The President can revoke the designation of a BDC if he determines that altered circumstances render the country ineligible pursuant to the statutory criteria. 9 If any article is withdrawn or suspended from duty-free treatment, it then becomes subject to the
normal rate which would apply absent GSP treatment. 0
The methods for policing GSP benefits to ensure that special
preferences are not granted to undeserving countries are called
"competitive-need limits."'" These limits are designed to remove
GSP treatment from a particular BDC for a specific product while
preserving the preferential treatment of that article for other
BDCs."2
The first of two competitive-need limits empowers the President
to remove the GSP status of an item from a BDC if he determines
that the country has shipped, either directly or indirectly, more
than a Custom's-appraised value of $25 million worth of the article
into the United States in one calendar year. 73 This removal is not a
6 Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 864.
Escape clauses provide import relief when a domestic industry is seriously threatened
by foreign imports into the United States. The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2463(c)(2)
(1982) provides that "[n]o article shall be an eligible article for purposes of this subchapter
for any period during which such article is the subject of any action proclaimed pursuant to
section 2253 of this Title section 1862 or 1981 of this title."
67 Id.
11 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(a) (1982).
69 The statute gives the President authority to bar a BDC from the US-GSP if "as a
result of changed circumstances" such country should no longer qualify for tariff preferences. Id. § 2464(b) (1982). Under § 2462(a)(2), the President is not permitted to terminate
a BDC's designation of eligibility unless he notifies Congress 60 days in advance of both his
decision and his justification. On the day the President issues an executive order revoking
designation, however, that country immediately ceases to be a BDC. Id. § 2464(b).
70 Id. § 2464(a).
7' See T. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 79-81.
7
Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 867.
11 Every year the $25 million limit is raised in proportion to the prior year's growth in the
United States GNP. Thus, this growth factor provides a hedge against inflation in addition
to an increase in relation to actual growth in United States production. T. MURRAY, supra
note 27, at 79.
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quota barrier to further entries after imports reach a set ceiling;74
rather, exceeding this competitive-need limit results in the loss of
GSP eligibility for the particular
article from the violating BDC in
75
the following GSP year.
The second competitive-need limit withdraws GSP eligibility for

an article from a particular BDC if that country ships, in a single
year, fifty percent or more of all United States imports of that article.7 As with the $25 million limit, the changes required by this
fifty percent rule must take effect ninety days before the close of
the calendar year, 7 subject only to a very narrow exception. If an
article is removed due to one of these two competitive-need limits,
the article may still be eligible for preferential treatment if the imports from the BDC did not exceed either competitive-need limit
in the preceding calendar year.7
The fifty percent competitive-need limit does not apply to any
eligible article if a similar or directly competitive article was not
produced in the United States on the date the US-GSP was implemented.80 Under the Trade Agreement Act of 1979, the President
also has discretion to waive the fifty percent competitive-need
limit in certain instances when the United States imports of an
article in 1979 were less than $1 million.81 This de minimis proviNemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 867-68.
Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1) (1982). Originally the statute provided that
changes based on competitive-need limits would take effect within 60 days of the close of a
calendar year. Because the GSP year runs from when the executive orders making such
changes are issued, typically March 1 to February 28, some changes have been announced
only a few days before their effective date since most appraisal statistics are not available
until mid-February. Nemmers & Rowland, supra note 31, at 868. Partially in response to
the short period of notice received by importers and exporters, Congress in 1979 changed
the implementation period from 60 to 90 days. See President's Report, supra note 43, at 25.
78 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(B) (1982).
" See supra note 75.
78 The President may waive the competitive-need limits if the BDC has (1) an historical
preferential trade relationship with the United States; (2) a trade agreement covering economic relations with the United States; and (3) an absence of discrimination against or
unjustifiable barriers to United States commerce. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)
(1982). This provision is generally known as the "Philippine Waiver" since only the Philippines can meet the first requirement. The only other country able to satisfy all three criteria
is Cuba, which is currently excluded from eligibility because of the prohibition against communist countries that do not have MFN status. Graham, supra note 1, at 525 n.51.
71 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(2) (1982).
-o Id. § 2464(d).
81 Trade Agreement Act of 1979, § 1111(a)(4) (1979) (codified at 19 U.S.C. 2464(d)
(1982)). The President may waive the 50% competitive-need limit when the total imports of
an article are less than "an amount which bears the same ratio to $1,000,000 as the gross
national product of the United States for that calendar year . . . bears to the gross national
71

71

50
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sion allows for an annual adjustment reflecting the United States
growth in Gross National Product (GNP), 2 thereby enhancing the
US-GSP's benefit for small trade items while decreasing the administrative burden of tracking insignificant articles, and reducing
importers' and exporters' uncertainty over these lesser items.8 3
In addition to competitive-need limits, the President may "graduate" countries from the program with respect to certain articles.8 4
A Senate Finance Committee report concerning the 1979 amendments urged the President to graduate countries in order to promote an equitable distribution of GSP benefits among beneficiaries
and to encourage successful developing countries to accept their
economic obligations in the international trading system." In 1980,
President Carter issued a mandatory five-year report to Congress
on the status of the GSP 86 which indicated a general reluctance to
graduate successful developing countries' eligible articles.8 " The
President's reluctance to administer an automatic graduation system stemmed from fear that forced graduation would alienate
these successful developing countries and jeopardize long-term
United States trade policy goals. 8
Graduation did not officially begin until 1981.89 The three controlling factors for invoking graduation are: (1) overall level of deproduct of the United States for calendar year 1979." Id.
" President's Report, supra note 42, at 25.
83 Id.

" No formal definition of graduation exists. It is, however, simply a term used to refer to
the use of the President's discretionary powers to deny duty-free status to what normally
would be an eligible product from an eligible country. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No.
1535, OPERATION OF THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 19 (1984) (35th Report, covering
1983) [hereinafter cited as ITC Report 1535].
" The Finance Committee specifically addressed this issue in its report on the Senate
proposal for reforming the US-GSP. See S. REP. No. 485, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Report 485]. The committee was aware, at that time, of the ITC's finding that seven countries (Brazil, Hong Kong, Israel, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Singapore
and Taiwan) accounted for 73.9 percent of the imports entering the United States under the
US-GSP in 1983.
" President'sReport, supra note 42. This report is required pursuant to the Trade Act of
1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2465(b) (1982).
"' President's Report, supra note 42, at 70-75. The President did support, however, a
carefully constructed world-wide graduation scheme. Id. For a general discussion of a global
graduation scheme see Frank, The "Graduation"Issue for LDCs, 13 J.WORLD TRADE L. 289
(1979).
"
President'sReport, supra note 42, at 70-75.
s8 U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, PUB. No. 1384, CHANGES IN IMPORT TRENDS RESULTING FROM
EXCLUDING SELECTED IMPORTS FROM CERTAIN COUNTRIES FROM THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF

PREFERENCES: REPORT ON INVESTIGATION No. 332-47 UNDER SECTION 332 OF THE TARIFF AcT

OF 1930 16 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ITC Report 1384].
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velopment in the BDC; (2) competitiveness with regard to the specific product presently receiving preferential treatment; and (3)
general United States economic interest (including evaluations of
import-sensitivity).9 ° Current data indicates a trend toward in-

creasing the number of discretionary graduations.

1

C. Renewal Changes in the US-GSP
The legislation renewing the US-GSP makes a comprehensive
overhaul of the existing program. These changes are embodied in
Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984.92 Details of this widely
supported omnibus trade pickage,93 particularly the provisions for
the US-GSP, were finally hammered out by a joint-conference
committee of the Congress. 4
S. 1718 embodied the Senate's position during these joint negotiations9 5 Senator Danforth (R-Missouri) introduced the bill on behalf of the Reagan Administration on August 1, 1983,9 e igniting the
renewal process. 7 After evaluation by the Senate Finance Committee,98 the substance of S. 1718 was incorporated into H.R. 3398, 99
"0Report 485, supra note 85, at 4. Import-sensitivity is described in supra notes 62-67
and accompanying text.
" The Finance Committee relied upon the following table [in millions]:
Year
Discretionary
Competitive
Total
GSP
Ratio of Exclusions to
Graduation
Need
Exclusions
Free
GSP Imports
Exclusions
Imports
1980
$ 443
5,600
6,043
7,328
0.82
1981
662
6,782
7,433
8,395
0.89
1982
900
7,108
8,008
8,426
0.95
1983
1,211
10,661
11,872
10,765
1.11
Report 485, supra note 85, at 5.
"' Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 501-508, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018-24
(1984).
"' The Senate approved the omnibus bill by a simple voice vote. The House adopted the
final version of the bill on a 386-1 vote. Green, Wide Ranging Trade Package Clears Congress, 42 CONG. Q. 2671 (1984).
"' The efforts by the joint-conference committee are detailed in H.R. REP. No. 1156, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as Report 1156].
" S. 1718, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1983).
129 CONG. REc. S11276 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983) (statement of Senator Danforth).
Introduction of S. 1718 marked the true beginning of the legislative process. But cf.
USTR Announces April Hearing Dates in Washington, New York, San Francisco, 7 U.S.
IMPORT WEEKLY 609 (1983). These hearings, held by the USTR in April 1983, signaled the
first public initiative to obtain critical evaluations of the US-GSP's operation and garnered
support for its modified renewal.
" The bill was referred to the Senate Finance Committee for consideration. 129 CONG.
REC. S11276 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983) (statement of Senator Danforth). The Committee held
hearings to discuss and evaluate this new proposal. Renewal of The Generalized System of
"7
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an omnibus tariff and trade bill, on July 31, 1984.10
H.R. 6023 provided the framework for the House's stand during
the negotiations of the joint-conference committee. 10 1 Representative Frenzel (R-Minnesota) introduced this bill, which was referred
to the House Ways and Means Committee for consideration, on
July 25, 1984.1"2 A similar bill, H.R. 5136, introduced by Representative Pease (D-Ohio) three months earlier had already been sent
to the Ways and Means Committee for review."' After rejecting an
amendment to H.R. 6023,10' the House passed this bill by voice
Preferences: Hearings on S.1718 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalTrade of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) [hereinafter cited as August Senate
Hearings];Proposed Renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences - 1984: Hearings
on S.1718 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalTrade of the Senate Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as January Senate Hearings].
Following Committee hearings, Senator Dole re-introduced S. 1718 in the Senate on May
24, 1984 with support from the Finance Committee for its passage as amended. 130 CONG.
REC. S6450 (daily ed. May 24, 1984) (Report from Finance Committee by Senator Dole). For
an overview of amendments, see Senate Finance Committee Officially Reports Generalized
System of PreferencesMeasure, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 1086-87 (1984). For the full text of
the Finance Committee's report see Report 485, supra note 85.
H.R. 3398, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H11531-61 (1984). The bill was first
introduced on June 23, 1983 by Represenative Gibbons by request and referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. 129 CONG. REC. H4473 (daily ed. June 23, 1983) (introduction of
bill by Representative Gibbons).
'00 COMM. ON FINANCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, 98TH CONG., 2D SES., OMNIBUS TARIFF AND
TRADE MEASURES: EXPLANATION

OF PROVISIONS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE ON JULY 31,

1984: To BE OFFERED AS A COMMITTEE AMENDMENT TO H.R. 3398 (Comm. Print 219, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Print 219].
H.R. 6023, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. Hl1000-03 (1984).
102 130 CONG. REC. H7842 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (introduction made by Represenative
Frenzel). Following recommendations from the Trade Subcommittee, the Ways and Means
Committee favorably reported H.R. 6023 as amended to the House on September 27, 1984.
Id. at H10418 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1984) (report submitted by Rep. Rostenkowski). For the
full text of the report, see H.R. REP. No. 1090, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Report 1090].
103 H.R. 5136, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. E979 (1984). Presumably, the Pease
bill remains in Committee and shall never be reported. Both bills were introduced in the
wake of hearings on the possible renewal of the US-GSP held by the Ways and Means
Subcommittee on Trade on August 3, 1983 and on February 8-9, 1984. See generally Possible Renewal of the Generalized System of Preferences - Part 1: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
[hereinafter cited as August House Hearings];Possible Renewal of the Generalized System
of Preferences - Part 2: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter cited as February House
Hearings].
10' The amendment as proposed by Representative Gephardt (D-Mo) was designed to immediately graduate the "big-three users" of the US-GSP - Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South
Korea. See 130 CONG. REC. H11004 (daily ed. October 3, 1984) (amendment offered by Representative Gephardt); Rules Committee Sets Guidelines for Full House Considerationof
Omnibus Trade Bill, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 362 (1984). Opponents of the amendment stressed
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vote on October 3, 1984.105 On that same day, the substantive text
of H.R. 6023 was incorporated into H.R. 3398.10 This legislative
maneuver ensured that a joint-conference committee would be necessary to resolve the conflicts between S. 1718 and H.R. 6023
before Congress could pass H.R. 3398.
1. Changes in Basic Authority
Title V of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 is entitled the "Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984" (Renewal
Act),' and took effect on January 4, 1985.1°0 The Senate, content
with the success of the original US-GSP, had planned for a continuation of the program for another ten years.' 0 9 The House, in contrast, only wanted a five-year extension and called for the President to submit to Congress a report on the operation of the
program before January 3, 1990.110 The House also wanted annual
reports from the President on the status of internationally recognized workers' rights within each BDC."' Congress finally compro112
mised on an eight and one-half year extension of the US-GSP.
The House further succeeded in getting the requirement for proposed Presidential reports put in the new legislation. 1 3
Under the Renewal Act, the basic authority for administering

that graduating these three countries would make the United States appear anti-Asian and
would take away the leverage necessary to liberalize the trading markets in these countries.
See generally 130 CONG. REC. H100997 - Hll011 (daily ed. October 3, 1984) (statements of
Representatives Gibbons and Glickman). The amendment was defeated by a vote of 233 to
174. 130 CONG. REC. H11012 (daily ed. October 3, 1984) (Recorded Vote Roll No. 440).
100 130 CONG. REc. H11012 (daily ed. October 3, 1984).
1" 130 CONG. REC. H11026 (daily ed. October 3, 1984) (The motion to incorporate was
made by Representative Rostenkowski pursuant to House Resolution 598).
'07 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 501(a) (1984).
100 Id.
§ 508 (1984).
109 Report 485, supra note 85, at 8.
10
Report 1090, supra note 102, at 22. Originally H.R. 6023 called for a 10 year extension.
The Ways and Means Committee, however, elected to extend it only 5 years. The Committee reasoned that Congress could evaluate the program as modified during this time and
decide later whether a further extension was warranted. 130 CONG. REc. H10995 (daily ed.
October 3, 1984) (statement of Representative Rostenkowski).
". Report 1090, supra note 102, at 22. The House realized that the President already
submits annual reports to Congress pursuant to § 116(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961. The House intends for the requested information concerning the status of internationally recognized workers' rights in BDCs to be a separate section in that report.
"" § 505(a) of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 schedules the US-GSP to terminate on
July 4, 1993.
1'
Id. § 505(b), (c) (1984). The Presidential report on the operation of the US-GSP must
be submitted on or before January 4, 1990 to Congress.
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the US-GSP program still rests in the President."" A fourth factor,
however, was added to the three criteria which the President must
first consider before extending duty-free treatment. " ' Both the
House and Senate agreed that the President should consider the
extent of a BDC's "competitiveness with respect to eligible articles."" 6 The primary thrust of this competitiveness consideration
is to focus the President's attention on his power of discretionary
graduation.1 1 7 According to the Senate, this fourth factor is not
designed to measure a BDC's conflict with a competitive United
States industry but to evaluate the overall economic progress of
the BDC. 118 The House stressed, on the other hand, that since a
BDC should have articles graduated when it has demonstrated
competitiveness, this fourth factor is to be applied in evaluating
both a BDC's general economic progress and its degree of competitiveness with regard to industries producing like products in the
United States and other countries. " 9
2.

Adjustments in Designation of BDCs

The Renewal Act makes several changes in the limits of the
President's authority to designate BDCs and in the factors he must
consider in making such decisions. The simplest adjustment accomplished by the renewal legislation is deletion of Hungary from
the list of developed countries specifically excluded from GSP eligibility.12 0 The House called for this deletion in recognition of
Hungary's per capita GNP which is lower than several BDCs enjoying preferential treatment under the US-GSP.1' 1 Hungary is
also a member in good standing of both the GATT and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and is a current recipient of MFN
treatment on its exports to the United States.12 2 The House clarified this deletion by noting that Hungary would not automatically
receive GSP status but rather must still apply pursuant to the re"I The original three criteria governing the President's authority, see supra notes 32-33
and accompanying text, remain intact except for one minor addition. The House added to
the first criterion the phrase "through the expansion of their exports." Trade and Tariff Act
of 1984, § 502(1) (1984).
116Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 501(4) (1984).
116 Report 1156, supra note 94, at 156.
117 Report 485, supra note 85, at 10.
118Id.
11,Report 1090, supra note 102, at 8.
120 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(b)(1) (1984).
11 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 10.
122 Id.
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quirements outlined under the modified GSP program.

'

The former GSP program barred a country from GSP eligibility
if that country had taken actions which effectively nationalized,
expropriated or otherwise seized control of a United States citizen's property without providing adequate compensation."2 4 Both
houses of Congress agreed that this provision suffered from lack of
specificity.' 2 5 The renewal legislation, therefore, makes explicit
that these provisions are to include intangible intellectual property
rights such as patents, trademarks, and copyrights.'26 Under the
modified GSP program a foreign government which repudiates or
nullifies a patent, trademark, or other intellectual property right
through legislation or administrative means may lose its BDC status or be denied eligibility as a BDC. The President, however, may
override a denial of eligibility if he determines that designation as
a BDC in a particular case is in the national economic interest of
2 7
the United States.'
Congress also gave the President authority to consider whether
the BDC's government is providing satisfactory protection against
any private acts infringing on intellectual property rights.128 In addition to the factors governing his discretionary designation
power,1 29 the President must also consider "the extent to which
such country is providing adequate and effective means under its
laws for foreign nationals' 3" to secure, to exercise, and to enforce
exclusive rights in intellectual property, including patents, trademarks, and copyrights."'' The House and Senate committees realized when drafting the US-GSP renewal that there was no standard test for determining whether the law of a foreign country
provides adequate and successful protection for intellectual prop-

,2 Id. at 10-11.
See supra note 43-44 and accompanying text.
125 The House specifically suggested that, even though intangible property rights should
naturally be considered a type of "property" within the meaning of the section, it wished to
clarify the broader term of property. Report 1090, supra note 102, at 11.
,,OTrade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(b)(2)-(b)(3) (1984).
127 Report 1156, supra note 94, at 158-59.
ISO Compare Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(b)(2)-(b)(3) (1984) (directed at acts of a
BDC's government) with Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(c)(3)(1984) (covering private
acts of citizens of a BDC). See also Report 1090, supra note 102, at 11-13.
129 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
M The term "foreign nationals" is intended to include United States "nationals and nationals of other countries with whom U.S. nationals have a contractual or similar relationship with respect to the sale or licensing of intellectual property; for example, a non-U.S.
license of the rights owned by a U.S. national." Report 485, supra note 85, at 11.
31 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(c)(3) (1984).
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erty. 3 2 Both committees under the present law, therefore, expect
the President to establish general guidelines for this determination
after consulting parties such as the United States Copyright Office
and the Patent and Trademark Office. 3'
Congress was motivated to include explicit provisions regarding
intellectual property due to the growth and prevalence of international counterfeiting,"" which causes lost sales, ruins product reputation, and hampers marketing networks.' 36 The ITC recently estimated that in 1982 alone United States firms lost six to eight
billion dollars in domestic and export sales and 131,000 domestic
jobs due to foreign product counterfeiting and similar practices.'3 6
The ITC concluded that certain countries in East Asia, many of
which are GSP beneficiaries, were the most prevalent sources of
counterfeit products.'3 7
The House unilaterally pushed for an eighth criterion involving
international workers' rights to be added to the original list of
seven which control the President's designation of BDCs.' 3 8 This
eighth criterion is subject to waiver if the President determines
that designation of a country as a BDC would be in the United
States' economic interest.'3 9 Under this condition, a country is ineligible as a BDC "if such country has not taken or is not taking

Report 1090, supra note 102, at 13; Report 485, supra note 85, at 11.
Report 1090, supra note 102, at 13; Report 485, supra note 85, at 11. Among potential
factors for the President to consider are the scope and duration of statutory protections for
intellectual property rights, remedies possible for injured parties, the government's desire
and capacity to enforce such rights on behalf of foreign nationals, the ability of these foreign
nationals to enforce such rights on their own, and whether there is a disparity between the
government's protection of such rights as between domestic corporations and foreign nationals. Report 1090, supra note 102, at 12-13.
34 The House was primarily made aware of the problem by a recent subcommittee report
1'

"I

entitled

SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND

COMMERCE, 98TH CONG. 2D SESS., UNFAIR FOREIGN TRADE PRACTICES & STEALING AMERICAN

Print 1984). The Senate was
PUB. No. 1479, THE EFFECTS OF

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IMITATION IS NOT FLATTERY (Comm.

made aware by an ITC report: U.S. INT'L TRADE

COMM'N,

FOREIGN PRODUCT COUNTERFEITING ON U.S. INDUSTRY: FINAL REPORT ON INVESTIGATION NO.

332-158 UNDER SECTION 332(B) OF

'THE TARIFF ACT 1930 (1984) [hereinafter cited as ITC
1479]. For a brief summary of congressional action on counterfeits, including actions relating to GSP, see generally Huser, Lawmakers Seek Crackdown on Phony Goods, 42 CONG. Q
1423-27 (1984).
Report 485, supra note 85, at 10.
1I6 ITC 1479, supra note 134, at xiv-xvii.
117 Id. at xiii.
118Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(b)(6) (1984). Unlike the House, the Senate originally included no provision in its version relating to international workers' rights. Report
1156, supra note 94, at 159.
See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
135

139
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steps to afford internationally recognized workers' rights to workers in the country (including any designated zone in that
country)."'"4
This same phrase is also in the list of factors the President must
consider before designating a country a BDC."4 Congress consist1 42
ently referred to "any designated zone in the particular country
in order to ensure that such designated zones are not utilized by
the BDC as a means of circumventing the new criteria on workers'
rights and that these criteria are applied to the country as a
14 3
whole.
The House noted three basic arguments in favor of linking labor
rights to GSP eligibility. The first is that, historically in its foreign
assistance programs, the United States has denied aid or loans to
LDCs that violated political rights. 14 4 Ensuring basic rights of
workers within BDCs under the GSP benefits is a logical extension
of such policies. 45 The second argument theorizes that forcing
BDCs to uphold workers' rights will raise living standards and
thereby help countries overcome hunger and poverty. 46 The House
contended that the ability to create unions and to bargain collectively for higher pay and better working standards is fundamental
to other economic and social improvements. Finally, the House
suggested that the lack of workers' rights encouraged United

140

Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(b)(6) (1984). The phrase "internationally recog-

nized workers' rights" is clearly defined when the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(a)
(1984), amends the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(a) (1982) by adding:
(4) For purposes of this title, the term 'internationally recognized worker rights'
includes (A) the right of association;
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of
work, and occupational safety and health.
1 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(c)(3) (1984).
142 In the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 at §§ 503(b)(6), 503(c)(3) (1984), this phrase "including any designated zone in that country" is included in parentheses..
143 Representative Pease pointed out when introducing his bill, see supra note 103 and
accompanying text, that such a provision was necessary "to ensure that beneficiary LDCs do
not use the designation of export zones as a means of circumventing laws that extend internationally-recognized rights to workers in those countries." 130 CONG. REc. E977, E979
(daily ed. March 14, 1984) (extended remarks of Rep. Pease).
14 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 12.
's
Id. For a discussion of organized labor's involvement in fashioning trade policies, see
generally Bosckor, The Tokyo Round: A Labor View, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 219 (1979).
146 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 11.
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States industries to invest in overseas production 1 7 to avoid employing higher paid or unionized American workers. 4 8
The last addition to the factors the President must consider
before designating a country as a BDC has raised considerable controversy."' 9 The Congress recommended that the President, in
making BDC determinations, consider the extent to which a country has taken action to "reduce distorting investment practices and
policies (including export performance requirements)."' 50 The primary concern of Congress was that United States export opportunities were being blocked by less conventional trade barriers.''
Specifically, export opportunities generated by United States investments abroad have often been reduced by host country requirements that United States firms limit their exports or that investment approval be conditioned on performance requirements
such as the production of a certain level of exports.'5 2 The House
also added a section requiring prospective BDCs to reduce or eliminate any restrictions to trade in services 5 ' such as barriers to the
operation or establishment of service-oriented enterprises or the
rejection of national treatment for such businesses. 54 The Senate
further added the requirement that a potential BDC provide assurances "that it will refrain from engaging in unreasonable export
practices, 5 5 to the President's assessment of whether a country has
provided adequate access to its markets. 5 ' Both houses agreed
that these factors, which connect GSP eligibility to trade concessions by the potential BDC, are appropriate prerequisites to extending preferential treatment.5 7
3.

Alterations in Rules for Designating Eligible Articles

Congress did not make many changes in the original US-GSP
section governing ineligible articles. 58 At the urging of the House,
Id. at 11-12.
118 This concern was the greatest fear behind the introduction of the Pease bill. See Shorrock, New Bill Links Imports with Labor Rights, MULTINATIONAL MONITOR 6 (April 1984).
'49 See infra notes 286-91 and accompanying text.
150 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(c)(3) (1984).
I51 Report 485, supra note 85, at 11-12; Report 1090, supra note 102, at 13-14.
"I

i51 Report 485, supra note 85, at 11-12; Report 1090, supra note 102, at 13-14.
'15 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(c)(3) (1984).
15 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 14.
'15 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 503(c)(2) (1984).
"I See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
151 Report 485, supra note 85, at 11-12; Report 1090, supra note 102, at 14.
15 For an explanation of the original US-GSP section concerning ineligible articles, see
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however, the Congress did pass a new provision which would require the Secretary of the Treasury to consult the USTR before
mandating regulations governing the rules-of-origin requirements
of the US-GSP.' 5 9 This amendment is designed to give the USTR,
which administers the GSP and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI) program and had requested the change,' a chance to have
input in the creation of regulations concerning rules-of-origin to
ensure consistency between the GSP and the CBI.' 6 ' Granting opportunity for the USTR to provide feedback, however, is not
designed to usurp the absolute authority of the Secretary of the
Treasury or the United States Customs Service in determining the
62
final substance of these rules-of-origin regulations.'
The House and Senate also agreed to expand the listed exclusion
for footwear to cover "footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods,
work gloves, and leather wearing apparel which were not eligible
articles for purposes of this title on April 1, 1984. ' ' 113 Both houses
recognized that such items were already prohibited administratively from receiving GSP treatment but wished to ensure their
continued exclusion.'6 Although the House never formally requested it, the Ways and Means Committee urged the USTR to
interpret the existing exclusion for "import-sensitive steel articles"
to include specially fabricated steel products. By including these
steel products in the existing exclusion, the committee sought to
alleviate the adverse impact that the GSP treatment of foreign
steel might have on West Coast steel industries of the United
States.' 5

supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
"',Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 504(a) (1984).
"0 The CBI is a package of United States initiatives to help Central American and Caribbean island countries revitalize their economies. The big mainland countries in the region
are not eligible to participate. One aspect of the CBI is similar to the US-GSP in that countries in the Caribbean Basin area are granted duty-free entry for their exports into the
United States. The CBI was signed into law by President Reagan on August 5, 1984. Interest and Dividend Tax Compliance Act of 1983-Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-67, §§ 202-231, 97 Stat. 369, 384-98 (1983).
161 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 15.
t62 Id.

,3 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 504(b) (1984).
164 Report 485, supra note 85, at 12; Report 1090, supra note 102, at 15. The Senate was
unsuccessful in getting watches deleted from the list of ineligible articles. Report 1156,
supra note 94, at 160. The deletion of watches was not originally in S. 1718 but was later
approved as an amendment to the Senate's version of H.R. 3398. See Print 219, supra note
100, at 4.
1'
Report 1090, supra note 102, at 15.
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Changes in Provisions for Withdrawing GSP Treatment

The initial adjustment to the President's authority to withdraw,
suspend, or limit duty-free treatment calls for the President to
conduct a general review of countries and articles eligible under
the GSP. Following this review, the President must submit a report to Congress on the application of country/product criteria
pursuant to any action limiting GSP treatment. ' Although the
House wanted earlier dates,"6 7 the new legislation requires that the
general review be completed by January 4, 1987 and that the subsequent report to Congress be submitted on January 4, 1988."68
Both houses strongly urged the President to apply these country/
product limitations for GSP eligibility vigorously to noncomplying
countries. Toward this end, the bill requires the USTR to seek advice constantly from any interested United States industry on the
BDC's adherence to the requirements outlined in the GSP
program.6 "
The basic competitive-need limits of the existing program are retained in the renewed US-GSP, 70 but there was considerable conflict between the House and Senate concerning the President's
graduation, cutback, and waiver authority. The House reacted very
strongly to the ITC's finding that the top seven countries in the
US-GSP receive seventy-five percent of the benefits.'
Accordingly, the House proposed a three-tiered system of mandatory and
discretionary reductions in the competitive-need limits that take
effect beginning on January 4, 1986.172
The House, in the first tier of reductions, called for mandatory
phasing out over a two-year period of all of a country's products
should such country reach a level of $9,000 per capita GNP in any
calendar year.17 Although the House noted that no BDC has ever
attained this level, the committee believed any country that does
so should be considered a developed country with respect to the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(a)(2) (1984).
The House wanted the review completed by January 4, 1986, and the report made to
Congress on January 4, 1987. Report 1156, supra note 94, at 160-61.
'e
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(a)(2) (1984).
Report 485, supra note 85, at 18; Report 1090, supra note 102, at 12-13.
'v
For discussion of original competitive-need limits, see supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
171 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 3.
17 Report 1156, supra note 94, at 160.
173 Id.
100
107
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GSP.1 74 Further, the House designated in the second tier that any
BDC that either has a per capita GNP of $5,000 or more or accounts for more than ten percent of the total GSP duty-free imports in the preceding calendar year have the competitive-need
limits cut in half for all of its eligible articles. The President, however, may waive this cutback in competitive-need limits for any article from such country after receiving the ITC's advice, making a
national interest determination based upon the new criteria, and
publishing his determination in the Federal Register. 175 Those
countries in the final tier which have per capita income of less than
$5,000 and account for less than ten percent of the total US-GSP
imports in the previous calendar year are subject to having competitive-need limits cut in half for specific articles. Only those articles determined to have a sufficient degree of competitiveness are
subject to the competitive -need cutback, however, and the Presi17
dent is permitted to waive such reductions. 1
Basing its position on the bill backed by the Administration, the
Senate avoided mandatory graduation requirements and gave the
President more discretion in reducing competitive-need limits. Beginning on January 4, 1987,77 the President would have discretion

to cut competitive-need limits in half on an article-by-article basis
if a BDC has demonstrated a sufficient degree of competitiveness
with regard to any article. 17s Following the product review report,
the President may waive any competitive-need limits after performing the necessary steps.1 79 The Senate noted that in making
his national interest determination, the President should closely
scrutinize the BDC's assurance of equitable and reasonable market
access and effective intellectual property rights protection."'0
In passing the Renewal Act, the House and Senate reached a
compromise solution for reforming the US-GSP by integrating as'7'
176

Report 1090, supra note 102, at 20-21.
Id.

176 Id.

at 19-20.

The Senate set this date in order to be consistent with the first deadline for the President to conduct the new review. Consequently, the House provisions for waiver were set to
begin with the requested review date of January 4, 1986.
77

178 Report 1156, supra note 94, at 160.

1' The steps required are the same as those proposed by the House. The President may
waive the competitive need limits after (1) receiving ITC advice on whether any United
States industry is likely to be adversely affected, (2) determining a waiver is in the national
economic interest based upon designated criteria in sections 501 and 502(c) and, (3) publishing his determination in the Federal Register. Id.
8o Report 485, supra note 85, at 14.
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pects of both committees' proposals. Under the Renewal Act, the
President may cut the competitive-need limits in half for any eligible article if, after conducting periodic reviews, he determines a
BDC has demonstrated a sufficient degree of competitiveness, relaAfter January 4,
tive to other BDCs, regarding such article.'
1987,182 the President may waive all competitive-need limits for
any article or BDC if before July 1 of that calendar year18 s he publishes his national interest determination based upon the ITC's advice in the Federal Register.1" 4 The President in making this determination is directed to give great weight to the BDC's market
availability and to the protection of intellectual property rights as
requested by the Senate. A very important aspect of the President's discretionary powers is that any waiver granted remains in
effect until the President decides a waiver is no longer warranted
by changed circumstances. 8 5 The President is not allowed to exercise his new waiver authority, however, if the quantity of eligible
articles involved exceeds an aggregate value equal to thirty percent
of the total value of all articles entering duty-free under the USGSP in the previous calendar year. He also may not grant a waiver
if the articles in question exceed fifteen percent of the prior year's
total value when the BDC involved has a per capita GNP of $5,000
or more or has imported under the US-GSP products having an
appraised value of more than ten percent of all US-GSP articles
for that preceding year.'" Most importantly, the House succeeded
in pushing through an amendment requiring mandatory graduation by a two year phase-out of countries with GNPs of $8,500 per
18 7
capita annually.

s Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984).
is' This date is consistent with the date established for conducting the general review.
See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
a8' The July 1 deadline is consistent with the new effective date for executive orders issued pursuant to application of the competitive-need criteria. See infra notes 197-98 and
accompanying text.
', Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984).
185

Id.

186

Id.

Id. § 505(c) (1984). This new subsection provides that the President is to determine
the per capita GNP of the BDC for each calendar year after 1984 based upon "the best
" The President then would
available information, including that of the World Bank ....
check to see if the per capita GNP of the particular "determination year" exceeds an
amount bearing the same ratio to $8,500 as 50% of the increase of the United States' GNP
for the preceding calendar year bears to the GNP of the United States in 1984. The Department of Commerce is designated to determine the United States GNP. The two year phase
out process is designed to cut the competitive-need limit from 50% to 25% beginning July 1
187
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Several other modifications to the limitations provisions of the
US-GSP, each with varying degrees of importance, were brought
about by the Renewal Act. The retention of the Philippine
waiver 188 and the Senate's suggestion that this waiver remain subject to reductions in competitive-need limits on an article-by-article basis'"" have little real impact. Conversely, the Senate sponsored provision that refused application of competitive-need limits
to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs)' 90 as determined by the
President' 9 ' sixty days after notification to Congress,'92 has potentially far-reaching implications. 9 ' The original provision exempting those articles which do not have a like or directly competitive
counterpart produced in the United States from the fifty percent
of imports competitive-need limits was extended into 1985.' 9' The
final version of the bill also raised the de minimis waiver from one
to five million dollars as had been suggested by the House.'9 5 The
House was unsuccessful, however, in changing the redesignation
provision from a one to two calendar-year waiting period.', One
last, strategically significant change included in the Renewal Act
was to require any modifications in article designation required by
application of competitive-need limits to be made no later than
July 1 of the next calendar year.' 97 This change was designed to
provide ample time for the United States Customs Service and the
traders involved with the US-GSP to adjust to the new legislation
and for the ITC to make tariff schedule publications.'19

of a determination year (a year when the per capita GNP was in excess as described). After
the two years elapse, the developing country automatically loses BDC status. Id.
188 See supra note 78.
,8 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984). Both houses wished to retain the waiver
but only the Senate wanted it subject to a reduction in competitive-need limits on an article-by-article basis. Report 1156, supra note 94, at 162.
..
0 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984).
"' The President's determination is to be based upon criteria for country eligibility with
particular consideration given to a country's level of economic development. Report 485,
supra note 85, at 15.
1"
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984). The President is to notify Congress at
least 60 days before any determination he makes becomes final. Id.
183 See infra notes 271-85 and accompanying text.
194 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984).
19
Id. The Senate made no provision affecting the de minimis level. Report 1156, supra
note 94, at 164.
198 Report 1156, supra note 94, at 164.
187 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 505(b) (1984). See infra notes 236-53 and accompanying text.
8 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 22.
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New Section to the US-GSP

The House successfully added a novel section to the US-GSP.
This new addition, entitled "Agricultural Exports of Beneficiary
Developing Countries,"' 1 9e directs appropriate United States agencies 2 °° to assist BDCs "to develop and implement measures
designed to assure that the agricultural sectors of their economies
are not directed to export markets to the detriment of the production of foodstuffs for their citizenry." '0 1 Clearly this section addresses the protection of a BDC's citizens by attempting to prevent
cash-cropping of cultivable land at the expense of feeding a developing country's people.20 2 Though not much is known about how
this new section will operate, it appears in reality to be a backdoor
means of appeasing domestic farm interests in the United States
which oppose GSP eligibility of agricultural goods.20 3
III.

SURVEY OF CASE LAW INVOLVING

US-GSP

There has been an increasing amount of judicial activity centered around the US-GSP. A critical survey is necessary, therefore,
to examine the impact of these judicial decisions upon the US-GSP
and the effect of the Renewal Act upon such decisions. Highlighted
199 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 507 (1984). The Senate made no similar provision with
regard to agricultural exports. Report 1156, supra note 94, at 164-65.
'00 Neither the statute nor the House Committee report gives a definition of "appropriate" United States agencies.
201 Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, § 507 (1984).
In the introduction of a similar provision in his bill, see supra note 103 and accompanying text, Representative Pease stated it was designed "to assure that agricultural exports
are not promoted within those countries to the detriment of the production of food for local
consumption within those countries." 130 CONG. REc. E979 (daily ed. March 14, 1984) (extended remarks of Rep. Pease).
203 Domestic farm interests in the United States opposed renewal of
the GSP by arguing
that all agricultural products should be exempted. See U.S. Farm Interests Oppose Including Food in New GSP, Cite Modern Production Overseas, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 590-91
(1984); FebruaryHouse Hearings, supra note 103, at 10 (statement of Julian B. Heron, Jr.,
Counsel, on behalf of the California-Arizona Citrus League, Sun-Diamond Growers of California, California Almond Growers Exchange, California Raisin Advisory Board, California
Prune Advisory Board, Tri-Valley Growers of California, and California Dried Fig Advisory
Board); January Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 64 (statement of W. Glenn Tussey,
National Affairs Division, American Farm Bureau Federation, Washington, D.C.); Id. at 67
(statement of Randy M. Russell, Member Services and Farm Programs, National Council of
Farmer Cooperatives, Washington, D.C.). See also H.R. 3581, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983)
(designed to exclude agricultural products from GSP treatment). It is possible United States
agricultural interests could lobby the agencies which will regulate this new provision of the
US-GSP and force creation of quotas and other trade barriers to BDC agriculture exports
receiving duty-free treatment.
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below for the practitioner are possible means of using the judicial
system as well as some statutory modifications for improving the
US-GSP regarding these judicial remedies.
A.

Challenging Presidential Authority

An interested party is allowed to petition the USTR to have an
eligible article placed on or removed from the GSP treatment
list.2 0 ' According to the leading case of Florsheim Shoe Co. v.
United States,0° however, the President has discretion to make
the ultimate decision regarding an article's GSP status. In Florsheim, the Florsheim Shoe Company, an American shoe manufacturer, petitioned the USTR in 1979 and 1980 to have certain types
of leather goods given GSP status. 0 6 After denial of these petitions
by the USTR, Florsheim brought suit in the United States Court
of International Trade '0 (formerly the United States Customs
Court).20 8 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision reached by the Court of International Trade. 0 9
In its decision, the Court of International Trade focused primarily on the competitive-need limits under § 504(c)(1)(B) and (D) of
the Trade Act of 1974.210 Although finding that Florsheim had
standing to bring the action as an importer within the "zone of
interest,"2 1 ' the court ruled that the President has broad powers of
,04 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
205 570 F. Supp. 734 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), af['d, No. 83-1371, slip op. (Fed. Cir. July 12,
1984). The case first appeared in the courts on a memorandum and order for discovery
conference. 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 275 (1982).
2"0 Buffalo and goat and kid leather were placed on the list of eligible articles
for GSP
treatment, yet leather imports from India were denied duty-free treatment by executive
order. Florsheim's 1979 petition sought to have created a separate category in the United
States Tariff schedules for water-buffalo leather, arguing that no directly competitive article
was produced in the United States on January 3, 1985. The USTR denied this petition,
finding that water-buffalo leather was directly competitive with calf leather. The 1979 petition for GSP treatment of goat and kid leather, based on the same grounds, was also denied
by the USTR which found that these types of leather were produced domestically. For a
summary of the background of the Florsheim case and a general review of the decision, see
Scope of Review of PresidentialAction Under GSP is Defined by Trade Court, 8 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 583-85 (1983); Court of Appeals for Federal Circuit Upholds President's
GSP Authority, 1 INT'L TRADE REP. 96 (1984).
207 Florsheim, 570 F. Supp. at 734.
'0' Customs Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, § 501(2), 94 Stat. 1727, 1742-44.
209 Florsheim, No. 83-1371, slip op. (Fed. Cir. July 12, 1984).
11 Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2464(c)(1)(B) (1982) establishes the competitive-need
limits, discussed supra notes 71-83 and accompanying text; § 2464(d) allows the 50 percent
limit to be waived if a like or directly competitive article was not being produced on the
date the US-GSP was implemented.
2"
Florsheim, 570 F. Supp. at 737-38. The court allowed standing to challenge the Presi-

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 15:39

discretion in designating and removing eligible articles.2 12 According to the court this expansive grant of discretionary authority was
not unconstitutional since Congress provided sufficient guidelines
and standards for exercising such power. 1 s Most importantly, the
court ruled that neither the President's findings of fact nor his
motivations are subject to judicial review.2" In so holding, the
Court of International Trade concluded that executive decisions in
areas of international trade can only be reviewed to determine: (1)
whether the President's action falls within his delegated authority;
(2) whether the statutory language has been properly construed;
and (3) whether the President's action conforms with the relevant
procedural requirements. 1 '
The changes in the US-GSP made by the Renewal Act go beyond the Florsheim decision by granting the President even more
discretionary power. The President can now factor into his competitive-need calculations nebulous criteria concerning a prospective BDC's efforts to provide market access and protect intellectual
property rights. The President is also given discretion to waive
competitive-need limits or to increase them in certain situations.

dent's decision based on 28 U.S.C. § 2631(a), which reads:
Persons entitled to commence a civil action. (a) A civil action contesting the
denial of a protest, in whole or in part, under section 515 of the Tariff Act of 1930
may be commenced in the Court of International Trade by the person who filed
the protest pursuant to section 514 of such Act, or by a surety on the transaction
which is the subject of the protest.
The court claimed Florsheim, as importer and ultimate consignee of the goods in question
and whose protest had been denied, had standing to contest such denial. Florsheim, 570 F.
Supp. at 737-38.
2) The court reasoned that the President's order denying the duty-free treatment was
not based solely on Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2464(1)(B) - (D) (1982), but also on id. §
2464(a). The court found § 2464(a) granted the President a broad range of authority to
limit, withdraw, or suspend the application of duty-free treatment. Florsheim, 570 F. Supp.
at 738-41.
212 Id. at 741-42.
214 Id. at 747.
Id. at 743. The holding in Florsheim concerning judicial review of executive decisions
is becoming the accepted standard test. See Mast Indus., Inc. v. Regan, No. 84-111, slip op.
(Ct. Int'l Trade October 4, 1984). In Mast, Plaintiffs contended that congressional delegation of authority to the President by § 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Mast Indus., Inc. asserted that certain interim regulations promulgated pursuant to this
delegated authority were arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to law. The court in Mast upheld the President's authority after applying the three-pronged test established by Florsheim. The Mast court further found that the Florsheim decision forbade it from even considering the factual basis of the President's decision to promulgate the regulations in
question.
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The Congress should therefore provide, as it does for ITC proceedings in antidumping and countervailing duty cases," 's statutory authority for reviewing the evidence before the USTR or the ITC,
and their factual findings which support the President's decisions
regarding eligible articles. "
Until Congress is persuaded to provide a statutory scope and
standard of review in the US-GSP, practitioners are limited in basing a claim to the three permissive areas for challenging Executive
decisions. There has already been some success, however, in challenging the discretionary decisions of the President in these areas.
The Court of International Trade in West Bend Co. v. United
States'1 s stated that the term "article" means "individual product" rather than "tariff item" for purposes of the competitiveness
test.2" ' The court in West Bend ruled that the President violated
the US-GSP, therefore, by failing to apply the test to individual

1'6 The court in Florsheim stated that "[Pilaintiff's reliance upon the scope and standard
of review of commission proceedings in antidumping and countervailing duty cases, clearly,
is misplaced since the scope and standard of review in such cases are specifically presented
by statute." Id. at 746; see 19 U.S.C. § 1516(a), (b); 28 U.S.C. § 2640(b).
7 In a report issued in 1980, the General Accounting Office (GAO) pointed out that the
USTR did not fully explain to petitioners the basis of product eligibility decisions. The
report stated: "The rationale for denying a petitioner's request are explained in brief general
language unrelated to relevant parts of the preference program law, to the specific economic
facts in a petition, or to the reason those facts failed to support the petitioner's argument."
GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE, TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAM DECISIONS COULD BE MORE
FULLY EXPLAINED: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMTROLLER

GENERAL iv (1980) [hereinafter cited as GAO].

The GAO also noted that petition-related
recordkeeping at the USTR was too informal. The report stated: "No minutes of interagency petitions are systematically collected or preserved, and complete documentary histories of each petition are not readily available." Id. Finally, the GAO suggested that the
regulations do not clearly state the type of information petitioners (usually BDCs) need to
provide in support of their petitions. Id. These problems must be corrected before any factual findings of the President are capable of review by the judiciary. But cf. the "Brock
Thomas Agreement GSP Program Changes" designed to make the petition process more
formal by requiring a standardized petition form, and at the same time more open by requiring the President to release a public report of the ITC's determinations. 130 CONG. REC.
H10998 - 11000 (daily ed. October 3, 1984) (statement of Representative Thomas).
No. 83-111, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 3, 1983) rev'd on other grounds, No. 84-85,
slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade July 13, 1984).
"9 The dispute centered around the government's contention that "article" in the GSP
always means tariff item. The court rejected this contention, reasoning that tariff item is a
broad term which encompasses numerous separate products. The court said that when applying the 50 percent limit or when granting GSP treatment, "article" can be viewed as a
tariff item number, but that it must mean "individual product" when applying the §
2464(D) waiver of the 50 percent limit if no competitive article was produced in the United
States at the Trade Act's implementation. For discussion of the background and decision in
West Bend, see CIT Defines Terms in 'Competitiveness Test', Finds Legal Defect in Presidential Action, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 261-62 (1983).
2,8
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products when he removed Hong Kong from the GSP for a particular eligible item.2 20
Similarly, the plaintiff in Luggage and Leather Goods Manufacturers of America, Inc. v. United States,22 successfully brought a
claim under the second Florsheim test concerning whether the
statutory language had been properly construed. The plaintiffs in
Luggage and Leather Goods Manufacturers were a nonprofit trade
association and a domestic union acting on behalf of employees
and manufacturers concerned with the production of luggage and
personal leather goods. The plaintiffs filed suit after the USTR refused their petition for removal of certain man-made fiber flat
goods following the President's designation of such goods' GSP eligibility in April, 1981.222 The Court of International Trade found
that such man-made fiber flat goods were included within the statutory language of "textile and apparel articles which are subject to
textile arrangements" and thus were ineligible for GSP designation.2 2 Under the Renewal Act, the court's decision is supported
by the specific exclusion for man-made fiber flat goods. Practitioners should be aware, however, of this type of judicial remedy for
challenging the President's discretionary authority in deciding
220 The court ruled that the case should be remanded to allow the correct procedures to
be followed concerning application of the 50 percent competitive-need limit to Plaintiff's
corn poppers. Plaintiff, however, was asked to notify the court within 20 days as to whether
it would make a claim of alternate classification of its goods. Id. at 262. On review, West
Bend, No. 84-85, slip. op. (Ct. Int'l Trade July 13, 1984), the Court ruled that the government had waived a defense based on "failure to exhaust administrative remedies." The
court noted, however, that this defense might have been decisive had it been raised in a
timely manner by the government. The remedy that had been available was 15 C.F.R. §
2007.0(a)(3), which allows an interested party to petition for a factual determination under
section 504(d) of the Trade Act of 1974 to get exemption for a product exceeding the competitive-need limits. If a determination is not made within the time an executive order is to
be issued, Customs will be directed to withhold liquidation of entries of the involved product until such determination is made. Practitioners should be aware of this administrative
remedy and resort to it when necessary to avoid, at a later trial, the government's defense of
"failure to exhaust administrative remedies."
"2 No. 84-53, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade May 11, 1984), partial stay of judgment granted,
No. 84-66, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade June 7, 1984). For an overview of the background and
court's decision see CIT Rules MFA is 'Textile Agreement', Bars Eligibility for Certain
Flat Goods, 9 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 998 (1984).
222 The man-made fiber flat goods in question were "billfolds, key cases, coin purses, and
similar articles of textile materials other than cotton (such as nylon, rayon, or polyester)."
Luggage and Leather Goods Manufacturers, No. 84-53, slip. op. (Ct. Int'l Trade May 11,
1984).
222 Id. Man-made fiber flat goods are subject to the "Multifiber Arrangement" (MFA),
according to the Luggage and Leather Goods Manufacturers court. The MFA is a "textile
agreement" within the GSP exclusion discussed supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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GSP status of eligible articles.
Proper Jurisdictionof GSP Claims

B.

In seeking a judicial remedy the practitioner must be careful to
choose the proper court since the Renewal Act fails to resolve
jurisdictional issues raised in Sybron Corp. v. Carter22" and Bar22 5 In both cases the United States disclay Industries v. Carter.
trict court noted that the Trade Act of 1974 was silent as to jurisdiction for challenges to GSP determinations.2 2 Congress should
statutorily remedy this problem by designating which courts have
jurisdiction over different GSP issues, as it has done in the past for
similar programs.22 The question in Sybron was whether the President was prohibited from designating microcover glasses and microscope slides eligible for GSP treatment due to the section excluding "import-sensitive semi-manufactured and manufactured
glass products." 2 The Sybron court ruled that it was proper for
the Customs Court (now the United States Court of International
Trade) to decide this complex issue since it related directly to national customs policy and concerned classification and rate of duty
on the goods in question.2 29
The District Court in Barclay, making reference to the unresolved controversy in Sybron, 30 held that the plaintiff's suit alleging the President improperly revoked GSP treatment previously
accorded to imports from Brazil fell within the Customs Court's
exclusive jurisdiction."' The court reached this conclusion despite
plaintiff's contention that there was no adequate legal remedy in
438 F.Supp. 863 (D.N.Y. 1977).
221494 F.Supp. 912 (D.D.C. 1980).
22 Id. at 913 n.2.
227 The court in Sybron noted that "section 331(b) of Public Law 93-618 amends 19
224

U.S.C. § 1516 to embrace protests on determinations on countervailing duties and antidumping duties. It is silent as to challenges on GSP determinations. (1974) U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2290, 2377. See also Senate Report No. 93-1298 reprinted in (1974) U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 7186, 7320." Sybron, 438 F.Supp. 864 n.2.
228 Id.
at 864. The exclusion of import sensitive glass products from GSP eligibility is
discussed supra note 61 and accompanying text.
229 Sybron, 438 F.Supp. at 865. The court ultimately ruled that it would retain jurisdiction until plaintiffs were granted jurisdiction by the Customs Court. Id.
230 The Barclay court noted that, in the three years prior to the suit before it, the jurisdiction dispute in Sybron had remained unsettled. Barclay, 494 F.Supp. at 912-13 n.1.
21 The court pointed out that the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1340 (1976), has
original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under any Act of Congress providing import
revenue except matters within the Customs Court's exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 913.
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the Customs Court.2 2 Subsequently, until Congress makes statutory provisions for jurisdiction, most cases challenging GSP treatment should originate in the United States Court of International
Trade.233
The decision on which court to choose can be very strategic with
regard to the statute of limitations.2 3' Rejecting a claim of equita-

ble estoppel, the court in Wally Packaging, Inc. v. United
States23 held that the statute of limitations was not tolled while
the plaintiff was being advised by a customs examiner to seek reliquidations. Practitioners should therefore bring their suits initially
in the Court of International Trade to avoid losing valid causes of
action because of the uncertainty of whether filing an action in the
improper court will toll the statute of limitations.
C.

Timing and ClassificationDisputes Involving the US-GSP

Timing is often a critical factor in judicial actions involving the
US-GSP. The court in Teters Floral Products Co. v. United
States 36 ruled that an executive order removing certain merchandise from GSP eligibility did not retroactively deprive an importer
of duty-free benefits. The plaintiff, therefore, was denied GSP
treatment even though the goods had been released to the plaintiff
before issuance of the order because the plaintiff had not yet received unconditional delivery of the merchandise.2

37

The Court

MS The court ruled that the Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction upon cases in which
it is capable of granting an adequate remedy. In Barclay, the plaintiff could have obtained a
Customs Court remedy, according to the court, by importing Brazilian hardboard, paying
the duty, and filing a protest. If this protest was denied, the Customs Court would have
accepted an action contesting that decision. Id. at 913.
133 The court suggested in Barclay that there are a few limited exceptions to the
Customs
Court's exclusive jurisdiction but failed to elaborate. It rejected Plaintiff's claims that it
required a class action not available in the Customs Court and wished to challenge an invalid executive order not a Customs determination. Id. The jurisdictional changes wrought by
§§ 1581-1582 of the Customs Courts Act of 1980 have not been fully interpreted regarding
the various types of GSP claims.'The United States Court of International Trade appears,
however, to have a broader range of exclusive jurisdiction than its predecessor. It is still
possible certain GSP claims might be brought in courts other than the Court of International Trade. Congress should specify, therefore, which court(s) will have original jurisdiction over all GSP matters.
.. A statute of limitations is a statute that declares no suit shall be maintained on certain
described causes of action unless brought within a specified period after the right accrued.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1077 (4th ed. 1955).
"'
578 F. Supp. 1408 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
136 586 F. Supp. 960 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
237 Plaintiff imported artificial flowers from Hong Kong on February 17, 1978, but these
goods were not released to him until February 25, 1978. The goods were removed from GSP
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specifically stressed that the importer-plaintiff had received adequate notice of the change in the GSP to take advantage of duty23 8
free treatment before the order took effect.
The plaintiff in Teters had a few days' opportunity to file its
entries in order to guarantee duty-free treatment, but failed to do
so due to "confusion." 2 9 If courts continue to hold that a few days'
warning is adequate, the Renewal Act probably will help in eliminating cases such as Teters. By changing the effective date of the
President's eligibility decisions based on competitive-need limits to
July 1 of the next year, traders under the US-GSP should always
have sufficient notice.240
Traders must note, however, that statutorily the President is not
bound to issue executive orders at any specific time before July 1.
The custom has been to issue such orders around February when
the information concerning the competitive need limits has been
collected and analyzed. 4 1 In moving the effective date to July 1,
the House Ways and Means Committee warned the President in
its committee report to H.R. 6023 to try to issue all executive orders prior to April 1 to give traders time to adapt to any
changes.2 42 As the court in Teters noted, the government does not
want to give too much notice of the GSP changes so that "importers might be able to thwart congressional intent by extraordinarily
increasing affected imports during the notice period. ' 24 1 Perhaps
the optimal balance is for Congress to make it statutorily
mandatory for the President to issue all executive orders designating or removing eligible articles and countries from the GSP no
later than June 1- one month before they are to take effect.
Upon similar facts to Teters, the court in Godchaux-Henderson
Suger Co. v. United States244 pointed out that an importer may be
able to alleviate problems of untimely filing for liquidation if it can

status on March 1, 1978 pursuant to an executive order rcmoving Hong Kong's GSP eligibility for such goods dated February 25, 1978 and released February 28, 1978. Id. at 961.
238 Plaintiff's customs house brokers were aware of the order on February 28, 1978 and,
therefore, could have filed the necessary entries before March 1. Id.
2'9 The court never indicated what "confusion" prohibited plaintiff from filing the requisite papers. Id.
"0 See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. This change should give the President
ample time to collect and analyze information from the product reviews and make his competitive-need and graduation evaluations long before the July 1 effective date.
241 Id.
2'4 Report 1090, supra note 102, at 22.
242 Teters, 586 F.Supp. at 963.
244 85 Cust. Ct. 68 (1980).
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establish "a clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence
*

. .

in an entry, liquidation, or other customs transaction ...

245

In Godchaux, the President terminated duty-free status to Nicaraguan sugar, but not before the plaintiff unloaded its goods without
filing a consumption entry. After the effective date of the removal,
the plaintiff first learned that when it unloaded the goods it could
have received duty-free entry." ' The Godchaux court reasoned
that the plaintiff's mistake or inadvertence was not in the entry,
but in failing to file any entry before Nicaraguan sugar was effectively removed from GSP eligibility. The Court, in dicta, suggested
that had the plaintiff mistakenly or inadvertently filed an improper dutiable entry before the effective date of the sugar removal
it could have reliquidated the merchandise with duty-free status.
Presumably the new July 1 effective date for Presidential decisions
will make this mistake exception obsolete so long as the President
heeds the House's request to issue all orders before April 1.
There are many cases in which traders have challenged Customs
to get their merchandise reclassified to make such goods eligible
for GSP treatment., 7 Practitioners should be aware of this judicial

option for gaining duty-free treatment, yet they must also be cognizant that the presumption in such cases is in favor of the correctness of the Customs classification.24 The burden is upon the importer to prove that the classification is incorrect. The old rule was
a dual-burden of proof by which the importer had to show both
that the government's classification was incorrect and that the importer's alternative classification was correct. According to the
Court in Harwood Manufacturing Co. v. United States, however,
an importer no longer has to prove the correctness of its alternative classification. 49 The court, in its own discretion, may remand
'" Id. at 69.
...Plaintiff learned it could have received duty-free treatment of the Nicaraguan sugar
on March 3, 1976. He received shipment of the goods on February 24, 1976, and the order
removing it from GSP treatment took effect on February 29, 1976. Id. at 68.
247 See, e.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.Supp. 1064 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982),
aff'd, 708 F.2d 715 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Rohm & Haas Co. v. United States, 568 F.Supp. 751
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Oak Laminates D/O Oak Materials Group v. United States, No. 84-105, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985). For a discussion of
the Court of International Trade's decision in Leathers, 555 F.Supp. 1064, see Importer
Wins Duty-Free Treatment Under GSP for Embossed Leather, 7 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 8384 (1982).
248 See Harwood Mfg. Co. v. United States, No. 84-57, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade May 30,
1984), reh'g and amendment of judg. granted, No. 84-104, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 19,
1984).
.. Harwood, No. 84-57, at 5.
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the case for reclassification by the Customs Service, decide what is
the proper classification itself, or schedule a retrial for the parties
to introduce additional evidence.250
As the court in Howard Rapaport v. United States251 points out,
importers may seek reclassification only upon liquidation after
timely filing of the proper protest. 25 2 The court noted that failing

to file timely liquidation protests may be overcome if there is a
clerical error, mistake of fact, or other inadvertence in the entry,
liquidation, or other Customs transaction. The clerical error complained of by the plaintiff in Howard was found not to be sufficient
2 53
to excuse late filing.

The Substantial Transformation Requirement

D.

A final area of the US-GSP which has generated much judicial
and academic controversy is the rules of origin requirements. 25 4 As

previously detailed, the thirty-five percent requirement can be met
by materials which are wholly grown, produced, or manufactured
by the BDC, by imported materials substantially transformed in
the BDC, or by a combination of the two. 255 The court in Tor-

rington Co. v. United States256 judicially acknowledged a Customs
requirement that imported material go through a two-stage process
of substantial transformation. Customs required that materials imported into the BDC for use in GSP articles be substantially transformed in the BDC prior to or during processing into "material
produced in the BDC" and then that this "material produced in
the BDC" be substantially transformed into the final article imported into the United States. 57
The plaintiff in Torrington, a Portuguese manufacturer of indus250 Id.
5

22

at 6.

4 Ct. Int'l Trade 215 (1982).
The court in Audiovox Corp. v. United States, No. 84-112, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade

Oct. 10, 1984) made some indications of what is not a "proper" protest. The court held that
protests of liquidations calling for reliquidation of goods at 5.5% ad valorem or 6% ad
valorem did not constitute intent to request GSP treatment.
253 Howard, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade at 216. The court refused to find the liquidation notice void
even though the date of entry was indicated as "07-22-08" rather than "07-22-80" and the
company of record was indicated as "In-Novo Co." rather than "In-Novo Engineering and
Development Company." Id.
254 See generally Cutler, The United States Generalized System of Preferences: The
Problem of Substantial Transformation, 5 N.C.J. INT'L & COM. REG. 394 (1980).
25 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
256 No. 84-101, slip op. (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug. 24, 1984).
"' Id. at 6-7.
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trial sewing machine needles, sought to have included in the
thirty-five percent evaluation made by Customs the cost of wire
imported into Portugal from a non-BDC and used in the production of needles. The Torrington court reasoned that the administrative agencies have consistently supported and employed the
two-process requirement and that such a restriction is not contrary
to the GSP statute and its purposes."' In ruling that there must
be a dual substantial transformation of imported material, the
court found that the wire in the Torrington case had been through
the required two-stage process.
Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States259 is the leading case
concerning substantial transformation.' 0 In Texas Instruments,
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals overruled the decision of
the Court of International Trade that mere assembly of fabricated
components could not, within the meaning of GSP as a matter of
law, create a material to be used in producing an article. The Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, in reversing the decision of the
lower court, held that the "assembly of encapsulated integrated
circuits in Taiwan from materials imported from the United States
constituted a substantial transformation of such items into new
and different articles of commerce such that the encapsulated integrated circuits could be considered materials produced in Taiwan
for purposes of the 35% value-added requirement under generalized system of preferences." ' In support of its position, the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals concluded that the purposes of the
GSP were promoted in that training employees with the technical
Id. at 7. The court stated:
Furthermore, absent such a dual requirement, the GSP's goal of industrialization, diversification, and economic progression for underdeveloped nations could
be frustrated. For example, a BDC could import eligible items, merely decorate or
assemble these items and thereby satisfy the 35 percent value-added requirement
since these direct costs of processing operations would be includable in the calculation. In this manner, BDC's could become mere conduits for the merchandise of
developed countries. This is not the type of economic development envisioned by
the GSP programs.
Id. at 7-8.
...520 F.Supp. 1216 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1981), rev'd 681 F.2d 778 (C.C.P.A. 1982). For a
synopsis of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' decision see Assembly of Fabricated
Components is 'Substantial Transformation', CCPA Rules, 7 U.S. IMPORT WEEKLY 288-89
(1982).
'" Several cases involving substantial transformation issues have cited Texas Instruments. E.g., Belcrest Linens v. United States, 573 F.Supp. 1149 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983), aff'd,
741 F.2d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Data General Corp. v. United States, 4 Ct. Int'l Trade 1982
(1982); Sigma Instruments, Inc. v. United States, 565 F.Supp. 1036 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
"' Texas Instruments, 681 F.2d at 778.
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skills to convert materials into articles laid the foundation for the
acquisition of even better skills and increased self-sufficiency.
Congress could have further promoted the purposes of the GSP
and aided United States industries by adopting in the Renewal Act
the American Association of Exporters and Importers' (AAEI's)
proposed definition of the thirty-five percent local qualifier." 2 The
main goal of the AAEI during the renewal process was to have all
United States inputs counted in the thirty-five percent qualifier to
promote voluntary use of United States materials and services by
BDCs.26 3 Congress should adopt this new definition to reinforce
the holding in Texas Instruments. Until Congress accepts this new
definition, however, domestic interests in the United States should
be aware of the dual substantial transformation requirement as judicially recognized in Torrington.
IV.

IMPACT OF RENEWAL ACT UPON

GATT

Providing preferential treatment to developing countries' imports into the markets of developed countries violates the first article of the GATT.2"4 Article I of the GATT contains the MFN provisions which require that trade policy measures be nondiscriminatory for all contracting parties." 5 The legal basis for allowing discriminatory treatment in favor of developing countries
came about in June 1971 with the approval of a ten-year waiver by
the contracting parties to the MFN provisions in Article I."'6 By
the terms of the waiver, developed countries were allowed to ac22 See February House Hearings, supra note 103, at 26 (statement of W. Henry Parsons,

Corporate Manager of Customs, General Electric Co., and Chairman, Generalized System of
Preferences Committee, American Association of Exporters and Importers, accompanied by
Steven Kessner, Counsel).
263 Id. at 32. The AAEI hoped to have United States inputs such as materials, fabricated
parts, engineering, design, or research (regardless if sold or provided free to the BDC
manfacturer) counted in the 35% qualifier to promote voluntary use of United States
materials and services. Id.
264 See DeBouter, Tariff Preferences Revisited, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 353 (1976), arguing
that not only Article I but also Article XXVIII is violated. Article XXVIII is commonly
known as the "reciprocity rule" and provides that negotiations on tariff reductions and
other import/export charges are to be reciprocal. Id. at 358.
26I The MFN principle demands that "any advantage, favour, privilege, or immunity
granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties." GATT, done Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, Art. 1.
266 The text of the waiver is set forth in GATT Doc. L/3545 (1971), reprinted in GATT,
18th Supp. B.I.S.D. 24 (1972).

GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 15:39

cord more favorable tariff treatment to products imported from
developing countries than to similar articles imported from developed countries.6 7 The "Enabling Clause,' 268 which was created by
negotiations during the Tokyo Round to permit preferential treatment to developing countries, allows the extension of the GSP programs past 1981 without further GATT waiver.26 9
The preferential treatment being accorded developing countries
was originally intended to be non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal.17 0 The United States accepted these conditions when embarking upon its own GSP program. New provisions in the Renewal Act
will greatly affect the United States position with regard to both
discrimination and reciprocity.
A.

Discrimination and the Least Developed Developing Countries (LDDCs)

Critics contended that there was de facto discrimination against
LDDCs under the previous US-GSP although the discrimination
was not evident on the face of the statute2 71 They primarily
pointed to an unequal distribution of benefits in that seven major
developing countries received over two-thirds of the GSP advantages.2 72 They also criticized the exclusion of certain types of arti73
cles from GSP treatment of particular importance to LDDCs.1

207

Id. For a discussion of the negotiations surrounding the development of the waiver see

generally Espiell, GATT: Accomodating Generalized Preferences, 8 J. WORLD TRADE L. 341
(1974).
28 The full text of the Enabling Clause (known properly as "Differential and more
Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries") is in
GATT Doc. MTNiFR/W/20/Rev. 2 (1979). For a detailed discussion of the GSP and Enabling Clause as developed during the Tokyo Round negotiations, see Graham, supra note 19,
at 170-71; Comment, Preferential Trade Treatment for Less Developed Countries:Implications of the Tokyo Round, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 540 (1979).
"0 The Enabling Clause permits developed countries to "accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to other contracting parties." This provision specifically applies to the GSP as noted in paragraph 2(a).
OECD, supra note 1, at 15.
270 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
27 A summation of the structural bias in the US-GSP can be found in Lahoud, The
"Non-Discriminatory"United States Generalized System of Preferences: De Facto Discrimination Against the Least Developed Developing Countries, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1
(1982) (concluding that a super GSP is required which favors the LDDCs). But see T. MURRAY, supra note 27, at 51-52 suggesting that discrimination in favor of the poorer developing
countries would violate the non-discriminatory principle of the GSP but acknowledging that
LDDCs must be further aided.
127 See supra note 85.
272 See Lahoud, supra note 271, at 7.
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Even though the GSP was originally conceived to cover manufactured and semi-manufactured products,2 74 the poorer developing
countries often cannot garner any GSP benefit due to dependence
on less sophisticated, labor-intensive products." 5 A final area of
discrimination against LDDCs was the application of competitiveneed limits in that often specialized products excluded for exceeding these limits constituted the LDDCs' only benefit from GSP
participation.27 6
The Renewal Act attempts to alleviate some of this de facto discrimination. The provisions for increasing the trend toward graduating countries and products 7 7 are designed to equalize distribution of GSP benefits among all participating countries. Statutorily
providing for increased discretionary graduation, however, merely
shifts the burden to the President to ensure that such graduation
takes place. The House measures for levels of mandatory graduation should have been adopted.27 8 Although not politically popular,2 79 these proposed provisions would have guaranteed across-theboard graduations. As the Renewal Act is now, countries which
should be graduated from the program can put political pressure
on the President not to exercise his discretionary authority. The
$8,500 mandatory cut-off for graduation is a significant step forward, but falls short of having any immediate impact.28 0
Graduation as an overall means of creating even distribution of
GSP benefits is hampered by the ITC's finding that developed and
advanced developing countries benefit most from product exclusions.2 8 The ITC found that excluded products tend to be sophis-

1'

See supra note 4.

275

The labor intensive products being excluded were primarily textile and apparel arti-

cles, leather goods, and footwear. Lahoud, supra note 271, at 7 n.33. Also of importance to
LDDCs, however, are agricultural items. Agricultural products, unfortunately, received limited GSP coverage. Id. at 9 n.50; see also supra note 203 and accompanying text.
M7Lahoud, supra note 271, at 17-18.
277 See supra notes 171-87 and accompanying text.
17 See supra notes 171-76 and accompanying text.
79 The rationale expressed by President Carter in his Five Year Report is still applicable.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. Supporters of the Senate bill offered by the
Reagan administration feared compulsory graduation would alienate those successful developing countries forced from the program. The Reagan administration also wanted discretionary authority for graduations as an additional bargaining chip for enforcing the new
reciprocity provisions explained supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 173-87 and accompanying text. The House noted that to date no BDC
has currently attained a level of $9,000 per capita GNP. Few BDCs, if any, will be affected
by the new $8,500 mandatory phase-out provision.
281 ITC Report 1535, supra note 84, at iii.
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ticated manufactured products, and that the more developed countries are better able to fill the market void thus created.2 82
Consequently, it is necessary to re-evaluate the types of products
being automatically excluded from GSP eligibility.
The Renewal Act further increases the list of automatic exclusions2 8 and thereby increases the discrimination against LDDCs.
United States domestic producers of leather products, for example,
argued during the congressional hearings of the renewed US-GSP
that leather goods should be excluded due to the effect on American employment through the high level of labor required.8 4 Yet
labor-intensive products such as these have the greatest potential
for allowing LDDCs to create the necessary infrastructure in order
to progress into more sophisticated manufacturing. LLDCs should
have GSP treatment extended, therefore, to include textiles, footwear, handicrafts (including leather goods), and more agricultural
products.
The Renewal Act greatly reduces the discrimination toward
LDDCs by automatically waiving application of competitive-need
limits. 28 5 This waiver will allow some of the poorer developing
countries to focus their industrial efforts on producing a specialized product eligible for GSP treatment without fear that success
in its production will result in loss of GSP status. There is, nevertheless, potential harm in becoming too dependent upon a particular commodity that may lose its marketability. The United States
should provide advisors to the LDDCs, therefore, to instruct them
on proper ways of reinvesting capital gained from specialized GSP
articles into more diversified product sectors.
Reciprocity and Market Access

B.

The new provisions in the Renewal Act which link the PresiId.
See supra notes 163-65 and accompanying text. Since these articles were already being
excluded administratively, providing for their statutory exclusion does not add to the
LDDC's problems. Yet it must be realized that administrative exclusions are much easier to
overcome than statutory prohibitions. This is why, of course, some members of Congress
were pressured by domestic United States interests to provide for statutory exclusion. See
also supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text discussing this precise controversy created
in Luggage and Leather Goods Manufacturers.
2s" See, e.g., January Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 102 (statement on behalf of the
Leather Products Coalition). The Leather Products Coalition calls for statutory exclusion
because its products are highly labor intensive and thus very vulnerable to import competition from low-wage developing countries. Id.
28 See supra notes 190-92, and accompanying text.
282

211
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dent's discretionary authority in applying competitive-need limits
and making BDC designations to a developing country's degree of
market access28 provide great potential for violating the legal requirement of non-reciprocity. Although legitimate support for renewing the program is based on the benefit to the United States,"s7
the GSP should not be used as a weapon for forcing developing
countries to make trade concessions to the United States.
The executive branch, unfortunately, has made it quite clear
that it plans to manipulate BDCs by conditioning GSP eligibility
upon broader access to such countries' markets for United States
interests."" Using the GSP benefits to force trade concessions from
developing countries is precisely the type of political behavior forbidden by the GATT because it hampers the free-flow of international trade. Speculation as to how much the President might rely
upon this provision in regulating the US-GSP is difficult.
If the United States should begin to place too much pressure
upon developing countries by exercising this illegal tactic, BDCs
should seriously consider collectively withdrawing from the program and demanding even more MFN tariff liberalization.8 9 Presently, developing countries often view general MFN tariff reductions as not in their best interests. They see such cuts as eroding
the existing preference margin which makes their exports competitive on the world market. 9 0 As renewed, however, the US-GSP is
limited in duration which causes instability in future projection,
s" See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
287

The Finance Committee noted that there are many benefits to the United States from

operation of the GSP program. It found that "[alpproximately 40 percent of U.S. exports go
to the 140 developing countries that are GSP beneficiaries. U.S. exports to these countries
increased at an average annual rate of 12.5% since 1976, compared to 9.6 percent growth in
exports to developed countries." Report 485, supra note 85, at 9.
28 August Senate Hearings, supra note 98, at 8 (statement of Ambassador William E.
Brock, United States Trade Representative). Ambassador Brock specifically stated that
"[tihe Administration proposes that the statute allow for the liberalization of competitive
need limits on various products as a means of further inducing beneficiaries to provide significant access to their markets . . . . It is clear the United States has much to gain from a
GSP program restructured to help induce beneficiaries to liberalize their markets in a manner commensurate with their level of development." Id.
289 The ITC estimated in 1980 that the average tariff level on items receiving preferential
treatment was approximately 9%. The ITC further stressed, however, that the recently concluded multilateral trade negotiations would reduce the average tariff to 4.5% from 1980 to
1987. GAO, supra note 217, at 65. With the margin of preference slowly eroding anyway,
BDCs might push hard for their elimination entirely and seek other non-tariff means of
giving their products preferential treatment in the markets of the developed countries.
290 See W. CLINE, N. KAWANABE,
T. KRONSJO, AND T. WILLIAMS, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE TOKYO ROUND: A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT 220-24 (1978).
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has a decreased product scope, and still penalizes eligible articles,
which successfully penetrate the United States market, through
competitive-need limits. Conversely, overall MFN tariff cuts are
advantageous because they are perpetual and cover all products.2 9 1
Should the United States abuse the new provision calling for BDCs
to open their markets before GSP status is extended, the BDCs
might discover that withdrawal from the program is the optimal
solution. To compensate for withdrawal, the developing countries
could demand reductions in non-tariff barriers which hamper import of their products into the developed countries' markets.
V.

CONCLUSION

The US-GSP may not have broad economic consequence, but it
plays a symbolically strategic role. Renewing the program until
January 4, 1993 signifies the United States' desire to continue
bridging the broad economic gap between the developed and developing countries by using trade rather than aid. Most of the revisions and additions to the US-GSP during this renewal process reflect a concentrated effort to enhance the equitable and efficient
distribution of the benefits derived from granting duty-free treatment to developing countries' imports into the United States.
Traders utilizing the US-GSP, however, must recognize that the
program is based on a dynamic process. Renewal of the program,
even with revisions, does not guarantee that it will function
smoothly and fairly in the future. Practitioners should be aware,
therefore, of the judicial system as a means of effectively challenging shortcomings in the US-GSP's operation. The shortcomings
which might be questioned range from improper presidential decisions involving GSP treatment to incorrect classifications of an importer's goods by Customs. Although the judicial option should not
be abused, the judiciary as originally designed by the drafters of
the constitution was intended to provide a check and balance to
the Executive.
Congress should also be constantly aware of the evolving nature
of the US-GSP and should strive to modify the system's design in
order to promote effective use of the judicial option by practioners.
For example, Congress should provide a statutory standard and
scope of review, for the courts, of the President's factual determi201

For a detailed statistical analysis advocating MFN tariff cuts over existing GSP

schemes see Baldwin and Murray, MFN Tariff Reductions and Developing Ccuntry Trade
Benefits Under the GSP, 87 ECON. J. 30-46 (March 1977).
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nations regarding designation and removal of eligible articles for
GSP treatment.
The US-GSP as renewed and revised can remain consistent with
the GATT principles of non-discrimination and non-reciprocity.
Though the renewed US-GSP allows discrimination among countries by waiving the competitive-need limits for LDDCs, such discrimination is necessary and commendable. Congress should even
make further concessions in favor of the poorer developing countries by removing statutory exclusions of articles which potentially
can benefit the LDDCs most. The President, furthermore, should
graduate more products and countries which do not need GSP
treatment, and actively apply the competitive-need limitations.
In applying the competitive-need limits and in designating countries, however, the President should refrain from emphasizing the
requirement that developing countries provide greater access to
their markets. This demand for reciprocal trade concessions clearly
violates the GATT ideal of non-reciprocity. If the US-GSP is used
as a weapon to force trade concessions, the developing countries
should consider collectively withdrawing from the program. Perpetual, across-the-board tariff reductions and greater relaxation of
non-tariff barriers may be the optimal alternative to an uncertain,
restrictive US-GSP.
Gregory Carroll Dorris

